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ABSTRACT
Social Impact Bonds (SIBs) are a novel form of cross-sector collaborations and an 
alternative way of financing innovative social services. Based on an in-depth long-
itudinal case analysis and drawing from agency theory as well as resource dependence 
theory, we examine the process of interest alignment among involved partners over 
the lifespan of a SIB pilot project in Austria. Our study shows the multitude of 
problems and costs that such a challenging arrangement of multiple stakeholders 
brings along, thus dampening overoptimistic expectations in SIBs. We also suggest an 
analytical framework that improves the assessment of SIBs’ probability of success.
KEYWORDS Social Impact Bonds; cross-sector collaboration; collaborative governance; interest alignment; 
resource dependence
Introduction
Social Impact Bonds (SIBs) have gained increasing attention in recent years (e.g. 
Edmiston and Nicholls 2018). Even though they were not piloted before 2010, their 
impact thus therefore still being relatively unclear, with about 200 SIBs active or in 
preparation the global spread of SIBs is remarkable (e.g. Dimitrijevska-Markoski 
2016). The rise of SIBs walks hand in hand with public sector austerity, an urgent 
need of innovation in welfare and social-service-provision due to more complex social 
problems, and the role that financial innovation can play in addressing this need 
(George et al. 2016; Fraser et al. 2018; Jackson 2013). Novel forms of collaboration 
involving various societal actors have thus become a promising option (Selsky and 
Parker 2005; Battilana and Lee 2014). SIBs have emerged as a new contractual 
arrangement across several sectors of society, i.e. the state, the market and the non- 
profit sector (for an overview, see OECD 2016). The arrangement involves private 
investors pre-financing social initiatives, which are then administered by social service 
providers. Investors get a return on their investment once a pre-defined impact target 
has been achieved. In response to the emergence of SIBs, questions have arisen 
regarding the systems of governance, accountability and legitimacy between involved 
partners.
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So far, only a small proportion of SIBs have reached their project-end, and only 
gradually have evaluation reports been becoming publicly available (see Maier, 
Barbetta, and Godina 2017). Until now, technical reports, consultation papers, and 
normative publications either praising or condemning SIBs have driven the debate. 
Yet within the literature a more fine-grained analysis of the divergent interests 
involved in SIBs is often neglected (Maier and Meyer 2017), where risk and reward 
are redistributed in novel ways amongst the different actors involved ‘at the inter-
section of the public, private and social sectors’ (Callanan, Law, and Mendonca 
2012, 11).
As an instrument of outcome-based contracting (Farr 2016), SIBs have become 
entities in their own right. In the United Kingdom in particular they have become part 
of the political reality, where they constitute a dynamic but persistent instrument in the 
toolbox of collaborative governance (Nicholls and Teasdale 2019; Simons and Voß 
2018, 2017, Millar and Hall 2013; Arvidson et al. 2013) Interestingly, SIBs continue to 
be developed and implemented despite their results generally not meeting expectations 
in terms of impact measurement, which is still scarcely applied in the field (Millar and 
Hall 2013; Arvidson et al. 2013).
Primarily, SIBs as a framework for collaborative governance were endemic to 
the UK, followed by other anglophone countries (Phillips and Smith 2014; Warner, 
Aldag, and Kim 2021). Collaborative governance developed as an attempt to re- 
align the diverging interests of partners in semi-privatized service fields such as 
social services, health care and education. Quite surprisingly, SIBs then also swept 
across to continental European welfare states with a long tradition of social 
partnerships (for a similar phenomenon with corporate social responsibility, see 
Höllerer 2013). Evidently, such forms of traditional collaborative governance have 
lost much of its legitimacy in corporatist welfare regimes (Falkner and Leiber 2004; 
Gerlich, Grande, and Müller 1988; Haarmann, Klenk, and Weyrauch 2010), thus 
preparing the stage for new collaborative mechanisms such as SIBs.
Against this backdrop, we investigate this frame of collaborative governance with 
respect to the alignment of interests involved, the legitimacy sought after, and account-
ability concerns among partners, which is similar to the formation of network govern-
ance (Triantafillou 2007). Analyzing the case of the first SIB in Austria over its full 
lifespan and thereafter, we will approach the following two research questions: (1) how 
do different interests, accountabilities and resource dependencies shape the arrangement 
and usage patterns of SIBs? (2) How do these factors influence the collaborative govern-
ance arrangement of the SIB? Theoretically, we draw on agency and resource dependence 
theory. Thus, we aim to reduce theoretical deficits in research on SIBs and to contribute 
to a better understanding of the role of accountability and legitimacy within this mode of 
temporary collaboration across sectors. Eventually, our research looks to provide support 
in decisions of whether and how to enter into future SIB arrangements.
The article is structured as follows: first, we portray the concept of social impact 
bonds and policy fields SIBs are currently relevant to. Second, we draw on agency 
theory and resource dependence theory as concepts to explain how SIB-agreements 
materialize. Third, we present the methods and data of our study, introducing our SIB 
case and its details. Fourth, we present our empirical findings that illustrate the 
configuration of interests and its effects on collaboration, the emergence of governance 
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to solve the multiple-agency problem, and reveal how actors’ resources have shaped 
this constellation. Finally, we discuss how the relationship among the partners and 
their specific resources affected the governance of the SIB-arrangement.
Social Impact Bonds
The mere term is misleading: SIBs are not bonds, but rather pay-for-outcome contracts 
(Cox 2011; Warner 2013). Typically, a SIB-arrangement comprises five parties: a) 
private investors agree to pre-finance a social measure in a specific policy field, which 
is delivered by b) a social service provider (SSP), usually a non-profit or a social 
enterprise, over a certain period of time. c) A government agency agrees to refund 
the investors – plus a return on the invested capital, provided that the measure meets 
predefined impact targets. d) An external success evaluator verifies the achievement of 
these targets. In many SIBs additional evaluators examine the overall process, the 
course of collaboration and the wider impact of the underlying social measure. Finally, 
SIBs are often initiated and managed by e) an intermediary who brings these parties 
together, negotiates the terms of collaboration and facilitates the process of developing 
and implementing the SIB (Fliegauf et al. 2014; Galitoupoulou and Noya 2015; Rangan 
and Chase 2015; Arena et al. 2016).
In the academic literature, SIBs have been covered only recently. The first instance 
only emerged in 2010 with the Peterborough SIB in the United Kingdom, which was 
pioneered by Social Finance (Disley et al. 2015). Since then, around two hundred SIBs 
have been implemented or are currently in development, mainly in the United Kingdom 
or the US.1 SIBs are argued to work especially well for preventative measures in the 
social realm, aiming to generate savings on future public spending by reducing follow-up 
costs that would otherwise affect the public budget (see for health care Fitzgerald 2013). 
For SSPs, SIBs generate funds for experimentation and development of innovations for 
their beneficiaries. Smaller SSPs have been found to not have this capacity (Disley et al. 
2011). At the same time, public funders are rather risk-averse (Liebman 2011). Private 
social investments by SIBs could bridge this gap of funding social innovations.
In the early years, SIBs focused on youth related issues, such as reducing reconvic-
tion rates of juvenile offenders in the case of the Peterborough Bond, or in the case of 
the German SIB Eleven Augsburg, providing job opportunities to vulnerable youth 
groups. More recently, a variety of issues and target groups have been covered by SIBs, 
such as homelessness (UK), university dropouts (Israel), early childhood education 
(Utah), diabetes (Israel), mental healthcare (Australia), the integration of immigrants, 
refugees and asylum seekers (Finland). The focus on youth emerges from SIB’s 
propensity for preventive measures, which is claimed to both save the public sector 
money and the increasing impact of early social measures.
Subsequently, the target groups or policy fields of SIBs have been subject to greater 
experimentation. Moreover, the features and characteristics of the instrument have 
increasingly diversified, too. This applies to the number of partners and the roles 
involved, the duration of the projects (two to seven years), the amount of the invest-
ment, the interest rate and the risk sharing among the partners (all-or-nothing vs 
proportional agreements, Scognamiglio et al. 2018).
Most publications on SIBs have been issued by consultancies, banks and other 
financial institutions (Deloitte 2012; McKinsey&Company 2012; Social Finance US 
2012). These publications explain how SIBs work, what benefits they are supposed to 
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deliver, or they provided technical descriptions. This body of technical reports presents 
an overall positive picture of SIBs’ potential merits. Meanwhile academic literature has 
also been growing. A more recent review distinguishes between three distinct narra-
tives (Fraser et al. 2018):
(1) A public sector reform narrative that calls for more market incentives and 
market discipline to remedy the management issues within the public sector 
(e.g. Callanan, Law, and Mendonca 2012);
(2) A private financial sector reform narrative, which proposes that SIBs promote 
social change alongside pursuing commercial interest, thus better aligning 
financial markets with the common good (e.g. Scherer, Schenk, and Finance 
2012);
(3) A cautionary narrative that warns about the further extension of neo-liberal 
logic in public policy making (e.g. Cooper, Graham, and Himick 2016).
The first two are complementary and paint a ‘win-win’ picture, whereas the third 
narrative highlights potential risks (Fraser et al. 2018, 9–13). Still, the lack of theory- 
based empirical studies remains striking, as none of the three narratives are consistent 
with relational theories explaining the exchanges and tradeoffs between the actors 
within a SIB constellation.
Yet there are some studies that have thoroughly analysed constellations of actors 
within SIB arrangements. Edmiston and Nicholls (2018) scrutinize the role of 
private capital in outcome-based commissioning based on four cases in the UK, 
presenting mixed evidence: private social investment and the real-time performance 
measurement did increase the responsiveness of service provision. However, this 
also increased the risk of corrupting actors by encouraging ‘gaming’ amongst those 
with a vested interest in the attainment of social outcomes (Edmiston and Nicholls 
2018, 73). In a similar vein to our study and based on a single case from the 
Netherlands, Smeets (2017) illustrates how collaborative governance theory helps 
to understand the dynamics of a SIB partnership. Propositions of collaborative 
governance (Emerson, Nabatchi, and Balogh 2012) would allow a SIB to work, 
but they are rarely practised. Clifford and Jung (2016) create a SIB typology based 
on ten SIBs. Del Giudice and Migliavacca (2018) analysed 67 SIBs and reveal that it 
is less the financial conditions, but rather the contractual structure that attracts 
institutional investors. SIB contracts should provide visibility and reduce agency 
risks.
Though these studies emphasize the relevance of governance arrangements within 
a SIB constellation, the literature is still lacking in appropriate theoretical approaches 
that allow for a microscopic view on SIBs. At its core, a SIB is a contract between 
multiple partners with diverging interests on a project under negotiation (Gustafsson- 
Wright, Gardiner, and Putcha 2015). A lot of effort is required for the initiation, 
negotiation, implementation and subsequent maintenance of the collaboration along-
side its formal and informal governance issues. Because of respective transaction costs, 
it is assumed that SIBs are not going to explode in numbers (Giacomantonio 2017). 
This ‘complicated relationship’ (Del Giudice and Migliavacca 2018) poses a deterrent 
to investors. If SIBs were to proceed in the future, however, transaction costs would 
need to decrease, templates would need to be established and challenges regarding 
collaborative governance and the inherent process of interest alignment would need to 
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be simplified. This requires a deeper understanding of the dynamics involved in 
establishing a SIB, the structural pre-conditions, the power positions of each actor, 
and how to address these issues.
Theory
SIBs do not only provide an alternative way to fund social innovations, but also a way 
to innovate public governance in specific policy fields by introducing network- and 
horizontal governance (e.g. Torfing and Triantafillou 2013, 2016). Thus, SIBs can be 
also seen as a particular contractual framework for public-private partnerships (Hodge 
and Greve 2007; Wang et al. 2018). For explaining the process of aligning and 
governing interests in SIB arrangements, we seek to learn from two theoretical strands. 
Agency theory (AT, Jensen and Meckling 1976), with its lens for asymmetries in 
collaboration (Eisenhardt 1989), helps to analyse diverging interests and suggests 
how to govern them. Resource dependence theory (RDT, Pfeffer and Salancik 1978) 
captures the role of actors’ resource constellations. By focusing on the different 
resources contributed to SIB arrangements, RDT sharpens the analysis of power 
relations, a perspective that we miss in most SIB narratives (and beyond, see e.g. 
Munir 2015).
Cross-sector collaborations face governance and accountability challenges (Forrer, 
Kee, and Boyer 2014) that are caused by agency dilemmas (Alchian and Demsetz 
1972). With regard to different actors, standards and norms, Koliba, Mills, and Zia 
(2011, 211) differentiate between three major frames of governance: (1) democratic 
accountability holds elected representatives accountable to citizens for representing 
collective interests and attaining policy goals, framed by laws, statutes and regulations. 
(2) Market accountability forms the relationship between stakeholders, in particular 
shareholders, owners and consumers. It aims at producing affordable goods and 
services in an efficient way at satisficing quality, regulated by laws and norms that 
protect consumers and regulate competition. (3) Administrative accountability is 
either bureaucratic (supervisors and subordinates) and based on authority, profes-
sional (professionals and laypersons) and based on professional norms and expertise, 
or collaborative (peers), and based in trust and reciprocity. Various formal and 
informal standards, professional norms, statutes, and agreements regulate it (see 
Bovens 2007 for a further differentiated framework of accountability). In a SIB we 
find all of them: a blend of democratic and administrative accountability for the public 
agency, and a particular mix of bureaucratic and market accountabilities for the SSP, 
the intermediary and the investors. Intrinsic conflicts across these areas of account-
ability are likely to exist.
SIBs should ultimately include a contractual agreement that regulates these con-
flicts. In a SIB arrangement we usually find at least two principals. The public agency, 
itself an agent of government (and of citizens), acts as a principal, delegating the work 
of finding partners to the intermediary, who acts as agent. Usually the intermediary 
also acts as a principal, as do the investors. Asymmetrical information and potentially 
diverging objectives and interests also characterize the SIB constellation. Principals 
attempt to counter these problems by designing processes and structures to control 
and encourage activities in their interest in a more or less strict way. In SIBs, the 
arrangement is specifically complex as the public agency finds itself in a multi-layered 
collaboration: government, parliament, political parties and citizens.
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The SSP acts as an agent of the intermediary, the investors and the public agency. 
Yet in many cases, the SSP is a non-profit organization that also acts for its benefici-
aries and for its mission. To whom are non-profits, having no formal ownership, finally 
accountable? To members, their beneficiaries, or only to their mission (Fama and 
Jensen 1983)? Hence we face a multiple and intertwined agency problem. This com-
plexity has rarely been a focal point within SIB literature, but has been touched on by 
social investment literature discussing the interplay between social and financial 
returns (Scarlata and Alemany 2010), suggesting a preference for philanthropic inves-
tors, e.g. foundations, to ensure that financial interests do not compromise social 
returns. This also holds for SIBs.
RDT (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978) is our second theoretical lens. From this perspec-
tive, all actors contribute specific resources, but also require others, such as funding, 
staff, information, and legitimacy. All decisions can be explained by a particular 
dependency situation (Nienhüser 2008, 11), whereby the environment is a source of 
uncertainty and constraint (Aldrich and Pfeffer 1976). With respect to the exchange 
relationship, RDT suggests that those in control of resources may exert power over 
those who require them. Power relations are non-transitive (Emerson 1962). Low 
specificity of resources, e.g. alternative sources or substitutes being available, reduces 
dependency; as do low requirements.
Prior literature has applied the resource perspective mainly to explain the initiation 
and diffusion of SIBs (Joy and Shields 2013; Edmiston and Nicholls 2018; Cortis 2017), 
and to optimize incentives for philanthropic investments into SIBs (Minutolo, Mills, 
and Stakeley 2017). Analyses of resources and interests within a SIB are rare, even 
though the whole collaboration is about generating, distributing and sharing resources 
such as funding, reputation, trust, expertise, social capital, etc. We will illustrate such 
an analysis with our case, the first SIB in Austria.
The case
We analysed the first Austrian SIB, which ran from September 2015 to August 2018. The 
target group of the social measures funded by this SIB were women affected by domestic 
violence. The parties included the Ministry for Social Affairs (the ministry), five founda-
tions as investors and the Centre for Protection against Violence and the Women’s 
Shelter as SSPs. The German based Juvat GmbH acted as the intermediary. Ernst & 
Young was contracted as the external success evaluator (for a summary see Figure 1).
The SIB’s impact rationale was as follows: women find it difficult to escape from 
domestic violence because of their economic dependence on their violent spouses. 
Therefore, the social measure of the SIB included tailor-made support to increase 
employability beyond existing services such as counselling and providing shelter, e.g. 
education and training, career guidance and job placement. In this respect, the SIB 
should have also filled a gap that had previously existed due to the lack of certain 
competences and resources among SSPs.
Two years before the project’s initiation, the ministry and the intermediary began to 
discuss the opportunities of SIBs in the Austrian context. At that time, the intermediary 
had already introduced the first SIB in continental Europe (see Scheuerle and Nieveler 
2017), and had the ambition to showcase a second SIB in a different setting. During this 
phase, the plan to launch a pilot SIB-project became part of the government work 
programme (Austrian Federal Government 2013). The intermediary was responsible 
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for attracting and contracting foundations as investors. Finally, four foundations and the 
intermediary itself (a spin-off of the German Benckiser Foundation) entered into this SIB 
arrangement as investors. A three-year project period was fixed based on an amount of 
rounded down €800.000, including a one percent interest rate per year. As in Germany, 
an all-or-nothing-approach regarding the repayment of the investments in the case of 
success had been agreed. As success criteria, partners decided for purely economic 
impact targets. The ministry would repay the SIB investments to the private investors 
if at least 75 woman found a job in regular employment of at least 12 months in total 
length, comprising at least 20 hours of weekly work and subject to social security 
payments, thus allowing for a minimum living standard.
The process of negotiating the SIB was rather lengthy. Much effort was put into 
explaining the fundamental concept of a SIB and bringing the partners to the table. 
Finding investors from the realm of foundations was not easy. First, the Austrian 
philanthropic foundation sector is underdeveloped. Second, public funding is typically 
prevalent for social services; in Austria, more than 50 per cent of social services 
provided by non-profits are financed by public funds (Pennerstorfer, Schneider, and 
Badelt 2013). The result was strong scepticism towards the involvement of private 
investors in the financing and delivery of social services, and their limited experience 
with cross-sectoral partnerships was an issue that had to be overcome.
Data and method
Our analysis draws on four rounds of qualitative interviews with (mostly) the same 
representatives of all involved partners between 2015 and 2019: the intermediary, 
the investors, the SSPs, the ministry, the success evaluator (verifier) and the accom-
panying evaluator, who investigated the experiences and conditions of the target 
group together with the wider effects of the services provided, and a process 
evaluator. As the SIB was unchartered territory, partners decided to employ these 
Figure 1. Structure and project partners in the Austrian social impact bond.
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three evaluators. As process evaluators, we observed the SIB process behind the 
social intervention, starting from the pre-contract stage to the termination. Our aim 
was to yield policy recommendations for further SIBs. Table A3 (see Appendix/ 
Supplementary) provides an account of the 27 interviews and the 30 interviewees, 
their roles and positions. 25 interviews were conducted face-to-face and two by 
phone. They lasted 15 to 95 minutes. The interviews were fully transcribed and 
coded with NVivo 11 (Bazeley 2007). In total, primary data comprises of 22 hours 
and 37 minutes of recordings, resulting in more than 280 pages of transcripts and 
170,000 words of written material.
The interviewing followed a semi-structured guideline that focused on themes 
such as the current perception of the different phases: (1) formation of the SIB, i.e. 
before implementation; (2) negotiation of responsibilities; 3) implementation from 
setting up the project operations to running the operations of the SIB project; 4) 
termination and reflection. Other key-themes covered issues such as motivation for 
participation in the SIB, the overall assessment of the SIB by each interviewee, forms 
and effects of communication, the collaboration between the partners, and the 
potential changes during the project implementation. After each interview we 
wrote brief summaries to capture the main themes discussed therein. Each respon-
dent played an active role in contract negotiations and/or the execution of the SIB 
agreement. Finally, all project-related documents such as contracts were collected 
and analysed.
The empirical data was analysed with the application of descriptive codes (Miles, 
Huberman, and Saldana 2014; Saldaña 2015). We derived these codes from available 
technical reports (e.g. Social Finance US 2012), scholarly literature (Maier and 
Meyer 2017; Smeets 2017) and theory-based categories: the role of resources, the 
motivation to take part, the alignment of interests, the role and responsibilities 
within the SIB arrangement, the modes of collaboration, communication and 
exchange, etc. We then identified and assigned the empirical material to an adequate 
theme area (or respective subtheme areas) and finally refined the system of cate-
gories to allow for new categories to emerge. Together this formed the basis for our 
interpretations.
Findings
Our findings are now presented chronologically, according to the longitudinal design 
of our study, and a differentiation will be made between the stages of the Austrian SIB.
Initial interests
The ministry’s initial motivation to realize the SIB was two-fold. First, there was the 
opportunity and interest to pilot a new instrument. Second, there was a strong interest 
in developing new services for beneficiaries that had not been sufficiently covered by 
social politics for many years, thus showcasing the impact of innovatively addressing 
this gap for future social service portfolios.
We can try a lot, but the result at the end should be that the approach of the social measure 
was effective and will be prolonged, and may well also be scaled to the entire country. This 
would mean success for me. Because my goal is that these women receive respective offers. 
(Ministry)
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The ministry relied on SIB funding as they wished to promote additional services for 
female victims of domestic violence, who are generally also a target group of the 
ministry’s policy making. Yet, the regular budget would not fund any measures for 
this marginalized group.
In these times, for that precarious target group, there is no political gain and no money. This is 
brutal. (Ministry)
The situation suited the objective of the intermediary, who wished to expand the SIB 
concept piloted by them in Germany. After the first talks with decision makers in the 
ministry, the intermediary managed to ignite interest and support for piloting a SIB in 
Austria.
To pick up such a thought that consequently and promptly gets into a government programme, 
which was timely also luck, as there were elections at that time, and that´s why it was written in 
the government programme. This has been a surprise, yes. Indeed, even until today I would not 
consider this possible in Germany. (Intermediary)
The investors already knew SIBs due to their engagement in impact investing, from 
international conferences and so forth. Their motivation was generally driven by the 
interest to launch a pilot SIB.
We don´t do this because the interest on this borrowed capital was that good, or because we 
categorically want to help this or that group, but because we deemed this instrument really 
interesting and it should get the chance to have a shot in Austria. (Investor 1)
We want to be part of the first SIB in Austria; we would like to see that something happens in 
our scene for this to get more popular, that you set an example. We liked the visibility and the 
general concept. (Investor 2)
The SSP became engaged in the operations only after the initial agreement between the 
ministry and the intermediary had been established and the investors recruited. This 
juncture had been planned previously, during the development and delivery of the 
social measure. Aside from receiving the offer from the ministry (with whom they had 
previously worked) of becoming a partner in the SIB, the SSP was also motivated by the 
additional resources it would receive for serving their beneficiaries.
Actually, we went to this meeting without prior knowledge of what would be expected of us, 
and had been presented with a clear draft of the project. Yes, we had to process this in the first 
place. (SSP)
There should be a project that offers support to a specific group that we serve, who have 
tremendous difficulties on the labour market, support to gain a foothold, namely without risk. 
It is indeed in any case a win-win situation with respect to the women. The women benefit in 
any case, even if the project is only successful in the context of the objective . . . that´s why I was 
interested in the project. (SSP)
There was a composition of aligned but partly diverging interests: the ministry wanted 
to develop new services for a marginalized group that could not be funded by regular 
budgets, while simultaneously implementing a pilot SIB that was promised in the 
government programme. The intermediary wanted to establish another SIB showcase. 
The investors wanted to participate in this innovative funding constellation, and the 
SSP seized the opportunity to raise additional funds for helping a marginalized group. 
The incentives for investors deserve a closer look, given the low interest rate – 
one percent per year – and the high risk of losing the investment completely in the all- 
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or-nothing constellation. Hence, the investors were strongly driven by potential 
reputational gains and by developing future opportunities for mission related invest-
ments (see Table 1).
Beyond these interests, partners brought in specific resources that were indispen-
sable for initiating the SIB: the ministry had political power, refunding capacities and 
an established relationship with the regional government and the SSP. The intermedi-
ary contributed expertise on the functioning of SIBs and access to investors. The SSP 
commanded expertise in social work and access to the beneficiaries.
Establishing governance & aligning interests
In terms of agency within the SIB, the ministry were shown to have a strong and central 
position of power. It had a contract with the intermediary who subsequently contracted 
all other partners. It also had the dominant role in determining the particularities of the 
SIB, as it felt responsible for the entire construct due to its accountability to the public.
Yet we were always those responsible. I mean, we determined everything. We determined the 
target group, the duration, the reward, the structure as it is, who has contracts with whom. The 
ministry was very decisive. Thus, we knew what we wanted and the intermediary implemented 
our wishes accordingly, and we want this sovereign responsibility, and we indeed have it, and 
we really want to take it. (Ministry)
The ministry had reserved all rights for external communication and major decisions, 
combined with the right to steer the process during the project if needed. For this 
purpose, project steering meetings were set up twice a year.
Actually not only for regular exchange, also to have a look, how is the project going, where to 
possibly readjust a bit. Thus, we want this project to be successful. (Ministry)
The ministry’s representatives were aware of the basic SIB concept, i.e. that repayment 
of the private investment depended on a predefined outcome. Yet, they defined their 
role as active guards of the social measure and of the SSPs in particular, despite their 
administrative accountability. As a result of their democratic accountability, they 
regarded their position not as a mere contracting authority, but rather in a welfare- 
state public service role, accountable to all the partners involved and to the overall goal.
Table 1. Summary of initial interests.
Who Wants/Needs/Interests Initial Resources
Ministry ● Fulfil the political will of piloting a SIB
● Engage an intermediary with know-how and experience as 
well as a network among investors





Intermediary ● Make the case for SIBs in a different setting
● Promote Impact orientation among investors and within the 
public sector





● Sourcing additional funds for helping their beneficiaries ● Expertise with topic 
and target group
Investors ● Support piloting of a SIB
● Gain visibility and legitimacy for philanthropic sector
● Test models for impact investing
● Financial means
Verifier ● Extend know-how in impact assessment
● Fulfil request by ministry
● Reputation
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In principle, we could lean back for three years and watch what comes out of it. However, that´s 
not how we see our role. (Ministry)
Necessarily, the ministry was in permanent exchange with its primary partner, the 
intermediary, who also acknowledged its integral role.
In the end, the ministry has the final word in all matters. Well it´s not that we decide anything; 
indeed the ministry has always reserved the right to take big or important decisions in the 
context of this project. Be it content-wise, but of course also related to communication, 
everything is linked back very closely. In this sense, we are always closely exchanging informa-
tion. (Intermediary)
Indeed, I do have the feeling that they see us like this, that we have . . . this steering, this 
checking task, because they check back, if they feel insecure whether they are allowed to do 
something or not. (Ministry)
Still, some self-concerns about this central role arose, questioning the unique value of 
the partnership compared to the usual way of contracting social service delivery. 
Despite the key position of the ministry in initiating, enabling and governing the 
SIB, the pre-funding by the investors was needed. The intermediary acquired these 
funds and recruited the investors, as the public partner had neither experience with nor 
access to private investors.
I believe the Ministry cannot approach foundations for getting a project funded. (Ministry)
No pre-financing investor would give the money to the ministry, because they would say, I pay 
taxes, why should I still give money? (Intermediary)
With a strong SIB related reputation and strong ties in the field of foundations, the 
intermediary took a central position in facilitating the discussions and bringing all 
actors to the table. The intermediary even promised to fund the SIB with its own 
money if it weren’t to succeed in acquiring investors. The whole process of initiating 
and negotiating the SIB took almost two years, from the very beginning of the 
discussion until the start of the SIB in September 2015. There were long discussions 
about the rationale and the mode of collaboration.
Why a lot of work? Because, you need an insane amount of time for these talks. . . . You 
need leeway so that your counterpart recognizes, okay you can work with them, and you 
are somehow reliable or respectable. Second, a lot of work, to understand the SIB as 
instrument. This fundamentally goes against any routine, against established practices. 
(Intermediary)
As the SIB did not mesh with the organizational logic of each partner, it required a lot 
of time and engagement by the intermediary to tie the partners together contractually 
and align them in seeing the value of taking part.
. . . and for me it is also a project that takes much time, to put it frankly. We had many talks with 
the representatives of the intermediary. We had many preparatory discussions. . . . Until 
everything was entirely, also with the collaborating partners, entirely fixed. (SSP)
. . . our main activities have been these contractual issues, which simply went back and forth 
between myself and a legal advisor, the law firm. (Investor 1)
The various levels of information regarding the technical details about both the SIBs 
and the scope of the partnership resulted in a high work volume and high transaction 
costs all round.
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What we have underestimated, though I have put this always positively, is that we had a lot of 
exchange. All of us have dealt with this topic on all levels, which really created an intense time 
dimension . . . this is not done with sitting together one or two hours. For sure, we have 
underestimated this, and me in particular. (SSP)
[it encompassed] negotiations, information seeking, everything from strategy papers, state-
ments, speeches, preparations for events, for which this might be a topic, for every management 
level from the department up to the office of the minister. Indeed, every time these three words, 
these three letters have popped up in our ministry, it resulted in work. (Ministry)
Obviously, establishing this SIB arrangement was very time consuming for the min-
istry, the intermediary, and the SSP. Though, as it turned out later, interests were not 
sufficiently aligned at this point.
Piloting & showcasing the SIB
In comparison to their usual projects and modes of operation, the key actors had to 
substantially adapt to the project’s requirements. Despite the complexity of the 
arrangement, the lengthiness of its initiation, preparation and negotiation, and the 
manifold conditions imposed by the ministry, the investors were not deterred from 
entering the SIB partnership.
Usually we are involved in the projects [we do] on an operative level. (Investor 3)
‘Cause it is a loan, we normally don´t do this, I guess only once. We generally do grants, we 
distribute money to partners, who don´t have to return it to us. (Investor 1)
We prefer projects to which we are closely attached, . . . or if we grant minority interest or 
mezzanine capital, where we have strongly asserted rights . . . This project differs fundamentally 
from that approach. (Investor 2)
The SSP had to adapt to the requirements, too, which finally foresaw a start date in 
September 2015, not leaving much time for operative preparations. The ministry’s 
dominant position allowed it to define technical conditions, such as limiting the 
funding amount to less than €1 million, the maximum duration of three years, the all- 
or-nothing-clause and a rather low interest rate of one percent per year. To make this 
SIB happen, all partners accepted these underlying conditions, albeit if only as an 
exception made in order to facilitate the delivery of the project.
In this case an ‘either-or’-solution was demanded. Either the target is fully achieved and we are 
repaid our SIB investment, or we lose our all our money. We have accepted this, due to our 
strategic approach. If you would select a business approach, this would be absolutely unac-
ceptable (. . .) in such a case you prefer to contribute to make this happen the first time, instead 
of demanding too much. (Investor 1)
To sum up, there was a very specific setup of actors, with the ministry and the 
intermediary having strong positions that linked all partners together. The investors 
and the SSP did have to compromise their interests in a large part, in order to struggle 
for financial resources (SSP), and to gain a reputation for innovativeness (investors). 
The investors and the intermediary shared the interest to develop an impact investing 
project.
There was some leeway for the SSP in selecting the beneficiaries, such as concen-
trating on the really difficult cases – as a social work logic would recommend – or 
rather cherry picking cases that had more promise of employment – as an investor’s 
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logic would recommend. The governance arrangement tied both the investors and the 
SSP rather tightly to the overall goals of the ministry and the intermediary. As resource 
dependency of the SSP and the investors restricted their autonomy, the conflict was 
settled predominantly by prioritizing the interests of the ministry and the 
intermediary.
Termination & failure
Anticipating the project coming to a close, the diverging interests became even more 
apparent. The ministry appraised the manageability of future SIBs. It conceived that 
a second SIB would need modified roles and contributions of the partners involved.
Well, we have made all these experiences and built up expertise and knowledge. This is clearly 
a pilot project. . . . I think a second SIB won’t be so difficult, . . . it could be accomplished 
quickly. (Ministry)
If, for instance, we would again have an intermediary, the question arises whether he would 
again always offer his services for free. (Ministry)
The intermediary acted also in the interest of the investor to create an investment 
argument for future collaborations.
My wish would be that an understanding is created that it is important to pay as much interest 
as possible. Not because you would say, folks lets earn some money, but because people being 
in the position of considering such an investment, people with money, must find this attractive 
from their point of view and say that they will invest in such a risky social project instead of any 
other nonsense. (Intermediary)
The investors finally stated that conditions were unfavourable for them with respect to 
the risk involved and their pubic visibility. They recommended that this should change 
in future collaborations.
I think, as an investor, what I would not do anymore is a SIB that is based on 0 or 1, this all-or- 
nothing logic (. . .) that is something I would insist on doing differently. (Investor 1)
I see conflict potential, if one of the partners – the intermediary or the government or one of the 
investors – especially with respect to communication and especially if it turned out to be 
successful, would dash away and take credit for him only, to gain a reputation with the public. 
I believe this must be synchronized, to avoid disharmony. It should be clear that this was a joint 
project and it worked well and even though it didn´t work out. (Investor 1)
At the core of the SSPs’ interest was catering to the needs of their beneficiaries. Having 
extensive experiences with projects terminated and not funded anymore, they 
expressed their interest in getting this project continued in some way.
I am afraid that the project will not be continued in this form, despite what the ministry says. It 
is so sad when so much knowledge, so much work gets lost and our clients lose this 
opportunity. (SSP)
In August 2018, the SIB was terminated as agreed. Subsequently, all necessary doc-
umentation was prepared and handed over to the success evaluator, who presented the 
results to the SIB project partners during the final SIB project meeting at the end of 
November 2018. Even though the project missed its impact target of bringing 75 
women into employment, the project was considered and announced as a great success 
because of its innovative character, the high number of women that were catered for 
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during the three years, and the good will of all partners in making this first SIB happen. 
The fact that the investors lost their investment as a result was mitigated by the 
ministry’s decision to fund the established services for another year with the aim of 
integrating them into their regular social service portfolio from 2020 onwards.
Reflections & lessons learned
Five months after the SIB’s termination, we conducted a final round of interviews. In 
their reflections, remarkable differences between the ministry, the intermediary and 
the investors appeared. For the ministry, few things changed compared to earlier 
statements. Likewise, the intermediary painted quite a positive picture, and rationa-
lized the strong role that the ministry played.
Contracts usually shift many duties to the intermediary, with few rights, and many rights to the 
public agency, with few duties. However, in the end they have to pay. (Intermediary)
The long and intensive cooperation in the SIB synchronized interests and perceptions 
between the ministry and the intermediary, which resulted in both of them perceiving 
the SIB as a success despite not achieving the target. Each of them are proud of their 
collaboration and innovation. In the ministry’s retrospection, the investors are rarely 
mentioned. Asked directly about the investors’ potential learning, the answer remained 
vague. Apparently, there was no further contact between the ministry and the 
investors.
It’s difficult for me to judge [the learnings of the investors]. I hope that they benefited, but it was 
not so easy. It’s a new arrangement, and cooperating with a public agency is always difficult. 
(Ministry)
The SSP was a little cautious in asking how to go on. Also cautious were the investors, but they 
asked for a discussion on what we should have done better, luckily not blaming us. (Ministry)
In the intermediary’s résumé, the investors play a larger role.
There were some comments, but overall they thought that they supported a successful project. 
It cannot be measured only by one criterion, have we reached the target and do I get back my 
money, but other issues play a role, too, and in an operative way, we’ve been very successful. 
(Intermediary)
Whereas ministry, intermediary and SSP have collaborated intensively and harmo-
nized their views, the investors were left out.
We were the first who related the intermediary with the ministry . . . therefore, we were angry 
when the intermediary then strongly leaned towards the ministry. (Investor 1)
The investors’ synopsis was much more negative than that of the intermediary and the 
ministry, complaining about three major issues: restrictions in media work, a lack of 
understanding for their specific interests, and a lack of information.
In Austria, we’ve seen the SIB as an opportunity to position foundations much clearer. The 
German colleagues didn’t realize that. For them, negotiating with the ministry was a priority. 
For us, it was the public image . . . yet the ministry was very cautions, permanently issuing gag 
orders . . . we wanted to present more strongly how we act as foundations. (Investor 1)
I really believe that cultural differences mattered. In Germany, charitable foundations are taken 
for granted, they don’t need any PR work. We have to fight for that. (Investor 1)
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At the final ceremony, I talked with the women of the SSP. We hadn’t dealt with them very 
extensively. None of us had the slightest idea how difficult it is to bring those women into 
employment. The ladies from the SSP told me that they of course knew about all those barriers. 
(Investor 1)
Altogether, the experiences of the investors dampen their hopes of engaging in another 
SIB, at least not under similar conditions.
We won’t accept an all-or-nothing-agreement in any case. This was awkward by the ministry, 
or maybe politically motivated. . . . Maybe they wanted to kill the SIB idea. (Investor 1)
If ever again, there must be an NGO (non-governmental organization) with an interesting, 
exciting, and innovative project. The intermediary must finds this NGO. . . . They must then 
find a public agency who guarantees payment, then go public, and only then they may contact 
foundations. (Investor 1)
Although their successful management of a new and complex project satisfied the 
ministry and the intermediary, the interests of the investors were not fulfilled. They 
neither got their loans repaid, nor did they yield the desired reputational gains.
Summary and discussion
Our study analyses SIBs as a mechanism for temporary collaborative governance, 
taking into account resources and the alignment of interests. We focus on a pilot SIB 
in a corporatist welfare state context (Esping-Andersen 1990), which provides specific 
conceptions of accountability and legitimacy. A priori, SIBs have not been considered 
as legitimate arrangements to fund and govern social services, in comparison to liberal 
welfare regimes where privatization of welfare is much more accepted (Phillips and 
Smith 2014). Still, SIBs have found their way to continental Europe due to the search 
for innovative methods to deal with dwindling resources for public administrations. To 
gain further legitimacy beyond the pioneering case, SIBs should sufficiently comply 
with the interests of all partners and facilitate their accountability. In this regard, our 
study raises serious doubts. In our exploratory research, we have asked how different 
interests, accountabilities and resource dependencies shaped the arrangement and 
usage patterns of SIBs. The answers are multifaceted.
As our findings indicate, the Austrian context is rather unfavourable for SIBs, given 
that it is a traditional welfare state that has a central role in providing and/ or funding 
social services with little experience of this type of cross-sector-collaboration, with 
private social investments only playing a minor role. With this in mind, it is not 
surprising that the involved SIB partners brought in rather diverging interests from the 
offset.
The ministry wanted to pilot an innovative funding tool for designing an innovative 
social service for a marginalized group. The SSP wanted to do something for a widely 
neglected and vulnerable group of beneficiaries. Both the intermediary and the inves-
tors were mainly driven by their interest to bring the SIB instrument to Austria. 
Beyond opening a new market for SIBs, the intermediary also wanted to improve 
management experiences, and the investors wanted to enhance their awareness of – as 
well as their image as – innovative charitable foundations.
‘Aligning interests in a new way means partially displacing or at least modifying 
previous interests’ (Maier and Meyer 2017, 5), or in some way compromising one´s 
own interest. The diverging initial interests led to compromises in the process on all 
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sides, which might be explained by the lack of alternatives in terms of their resource- 
dependence. As Table 1 summarizes the initial interests of the actors, Table 2 provides 
an overview of their resources and dependencies as they have emerged during the 
process. We see patterns of dependence and interdependence, ‘producing inter- 
organisational as well as intra-organisational power affecting the organizational beha-
viour of each stakeholder’ (Pfeffer 1987, 27). This turned out to be one of the key 
drivers of interest alignment in this phase, namely making this SIB possible at the 
expense of original interests (see Table 2).
The constellation described in Table 2 sets the stage for answering our second 
research question: how did interests, resource dependencies and different accountabil-
ities in particular influence the collaborative governance arrangement of the SIB? 
Theoretically, interests, resource dependencies and agency roles rely on different 
accountabilities. For the ministry, we see a democratic accountability towards demo-
cratic institutions, an administrative accountability towards public auditors and 
a democratic accountability towards a social-democratic welfare tradition. The inter-
mediary was founded in order to disseminate impact orientation and cross-sector 
public social service provision. Formally, the intermediary as a corporation was 
accountable to its mother foundation (market accountability), but in developing 
professionalism in impact investing, administrative accountability also played a role. 
Likewise, the SSP is subject to market and administrative accountability, as it was 
primarily accountable to its professional logic (social work) and to the beneficiaries. 
The investors were formally answerable to their boards, their founders and the mis-
sions of their endowments, and as a result were subject only to a particular form of 
market accountability.
In viewing this accountability configuration, the interests and activities of all parties 
become clear. Even though it was not a risk in financial terms, the SIB challenged the 
multiple accountabilities of the ministry. Hence, the ministry pushed for Austrian 
philanthropic foundations, an all-or-nothing contract, a high impact threshold and 
a rigid communication policy. The intermediary wanted to implement the SIB at 
almost any cost. The SSP concentrated on professional delivery of service and did 
not play a very active role in the overall governance arrangement. Finally, due to 
accountability deficits of philanthropic foundations (Reich 2018), the investors failed 
to clearly convey their interest in reputational gains. Investors should have claimed for 
more transparency, visibility and a further differentiated impact measurement.
This complex accountability setup made the process long and the governance 
arrangement costly. Aligning members’ interests turned out to be resource-intense 
in terms of time, attention and effort invested. Still, the outcome was quite far from 
optimum. For instance, the investors’ interest in reputational gains for their innova-
tiveness could have been much better satisfied, if the ministry had relaxed its commu-
nication monopoly. Obviously, even this long process did not succeed in making the 
initial interests, resource dependencies, and accountability requirements sufficiently 
clear for the participants.
Considering the extremely long phase of negotiations and preparations, the mere 
launch of the SIB was a success in itself. A positive atmosphere between members of 
the collaboration developed, which in turn changed the transactional contract into 
a relational one that relied on trust rather than purely economic incentives and 
established longer relationships (Bovaird 2004, 206), at least between ministry, inter-
mediary and SSP. However, the long initiation phase, accompanied by intense 
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information seeking, in-depth negotiations and complex legal procedures, did not only 
result in high initial transaction costs. It also resulted in a partnership characterized by 
knowhow exchange and mutual support during the implementation, which was again 
very expensive. Starkly put, it created a community of fate and even displayed some 
signs of escalating commitment (Staw 1981).
Both the conflicts over accountability together with the failure to align the interests 
of all parties resulted in the disappointment of the investors’ expectations. This will 
reduce their willingness to take part in a future SIB. Likewise, many services were not 
paid for, such as those carried out by the intermediary, who provided his services pro 
bono, and the success evaluator who charged a heavily subsidized rate. Further, the 
costs of negotiations and information seeking were not internalised within the cost 
structure of the SIB arrangement, with one investor having helped the SSP to bring in 
jobs. Such costs would need to be considered in upcoming SIBs. Given the considerable 
transaction costs, our case study does not suggest that SIBs will become legitimate 
instruments for collaborative governance in corporatist welfare contexts, so long as 
governments are unwilling to share reputational gains with private investors.
Conclusion
Our study suggests a framework that explains the success or failure of SIBs as 
temporary arrangements of collaborative cross-sector governance. This framework 
analyses interests, resources, governance roles, and accountability requirements (as 
shown in Tables 1 and 2). It thus provides a detailed perspective and allows for 
assessment of whether a particular SIB will survive or collapse. We recommend policy 
makers to apply this framework in advance to better assess critical conflicts of interests 
and roles, thus enhancing the likeliness of SIBs’ success. Anyway, we are not naïve to 
fully trust in partners’ willingness and preparedness to unfold frankly their interests 
and resource dependencies ex ante, as we do not overestimate the benefits of transpar-
ency. However, in a SIB due diligence process run by the intermediary, our framework 
would contribute to increase transparency.
Aside from the accountability setup, the potential of SIBs in collaborative govern-
ance of cross-sector collaborations requires a few further questions to be addressed: 
first, how to deal with the transaction costs? If they are internalized into the SIB, they 
will dampen either interest rates or the investment available for measures. Second, is 
there sufficient philanthropic capital available that is provided by foundations with 
congruent target areas who are willing to substitute part of their grant giving by SIB 
investments? Our findings suggest that these factors are crucial for SIBs. We hope that 
our findings contribute to a less ideological and more realistic approach to their 
initiation. We do not argue in the vein of a public sector reform narrative, nor do we 
provide any support for SIBs fostering financial reforms. Under specific conditions, 
SIBs may neatly shape public-private partnerships to foster social innovation. However, 
aligning interests and designing governance processes and structures are non-trivial 
and must be continually adjusted. Our findings thus contribute to a rather cautionary 
narrative of SIBs.
The limitations of our analysis result from our empirical design, a longitudinal case 
study only investigating a very specific pilot case in a particular welfare environment. 
Despite the limited generalizability, we are convinced that our analysis unravels com-
plex accountability, interests and resource arrangements, and displays conflicts typical 
18 R. MILLNER AND M. MEYER
to SIBs. We have outlined a framework of how to analyse SIBs and have shown how 
different arrangements of interests and resource dependences will shape governance 
arrangements. Of course, our analysis applies selective theoretical lenses. Different 
lenses, e.g. institutional logics or multilevel governance, may yield complementary 
findings. We also focus on organizational actors, disregarding the relevance of indivi-
dual actors and of macro-political forces.
Future research should broaden and deepen knowledge, and should thus consider 
the following recommendations: first, our theoretical framework could be applied to 
analyse other SIBs to broaden the empirical evidence. Second, knowledge could be 
deepened by analysing how the partners approach their decisions as organizations. 
Third, research should inform decision-making: how can interests and accountabilities 
be aligned more efficiently, especially in the phase of initiating and contracting a SIB?
Ultimately, further research should also explore alternative methods of collabora-
tive governance that relax the rigid framework of public accountabilities. Maybe 
innovative social policies need not only be funded with private impact investment. 
The discussion on SIBs is still polarized: either it is seen as a powerful framework to 
encourage and implement social innovations and to forward cross-sectoral collabora-
tions for solving the most urgent social problems, or it is condemned as another wicked 
tool to further economize the realm of social welfare and social services. Research 
should contribute towards overcoming this polarization by providing more empirical 
evidence.
Note
1. Two sources currently provide databases for an overview of the number of SIBs, namely Social 
Finance UK (https://sibdatabase.socialfinance.org.uk) and Government Outcomes Lab at the 
University of Oxford, (https://golab.bsg.ox.ac.uk/knowledge-bank/indigo-data-and- 
visualisation/impact-bond-dataset-v2). Numbers and details about running SIBs differ slightly, 
and diverge more substantially on the figures with respect to current SIBs in preparation.
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